Summary Statistics

Contribution Limits and Donation Behavior
In this section I show that changes in contribution limits affect the fundraising patterns of candidates. Specifically, I show that when states decrease limits, the average contribution given to candidates decreases, the number of donors hitting the maximum contribution amount increases, the average amount of money raised by candidates from the limited source decreases, and the total amount of money raised in the state decreases. While it may seem obvious that limits should reduce the supply of money into politics, it is important to show that these various limits do indeed impact donors' and legislators' behavior. These results suggest that contribution limits at the state level are more than words on paper. They actually constrain and alter the fundraising of legislators and change the relationship between candidates and contributors.
Figures A1, A2, A3, and A4 show the bivariate correlations between contribution limits and various measures of donation behavior. In each plot, every point is the average value for states with contribution limits at that level. The horizontal axes show the contribution limits on a logged scale. Figure A1 shows the relationship between limits on individuals (PACs) and the average contribution size from individuals (PACs) to candidates. The y-axis shows the average contribution amount for each candidate on a logged scale. Lower limits lead to lower average contributions from donors. The lines displayed over the plots show a nonparametric loess fit of the data. Figure A2 shows the relationship between limits and the percent of donors who contribute the maximum amount. The results in the plot align with the coefficients in the model and show that lower limits lead to more contributors becoming constrained in their giving by the limit. Figure A3 shows the relationship between individual (PAC) limits and the total amount of money raised by candidates from individuals (PACs). Here we also see higher limits leading to more money raised in total. Finally, Figure A4 shows that when limits increase there is more money raised in the state overall.
Limit Amount and Average Contribution Amount Individual Donors
Log Contribution Limit Log Average Contribution : Legislator Ideology and Average Contribution Size -These plots show the relationship between legislator ideology and the average contribution size. As contribution limits increase, the average contribution size increases as well. This shows that limits are having a binding effect on donors' behavior.
Limit Amount and Donors Giving Maximum Individual Donors
Log Contribution Limit Percent Contributors Maximizing Figure A3 : Legislator Ideology and Total Money Raised -These plots show the relationship between legislator ideology and the total amount of money raised by candidates from these sources. As contribution limits increase, the total amount raised increases as well. Figure A4 : Legislator Ideology and Total Money Raised in the State -These plots show the relationship between legislator ideology and the total amount of money raised by candidates from these sources in the state. As contribution limits increase, the total supply of money in the state increases as well. When limits are present, I follow previous models in this paper by including an interaction variable that is equal to the logged limit amount times an indicator that is equal to 1 when limits are imposed. I test separate models for individual and PAC limits with three different dependent variables for a total of six models. The first dependent variable is the log of the average contribution for each legislator from either individuals or PACs. The second dependent variable is the percent of the candidate's donors who gave the maximum allowable amount. In this model I do not include cases with no contribution limit since it is impossible for a person to give the maximum allowable amount. The final dependent variable is the log of the total amount of money raised by the candidate from either individuals or PACs.
In each model one observation represents one candidate in one election cycle. Formally, the model for legislators i in state s at time t are as follows:
In every model the effects demonstrate a substantial effect of contribution limits on candidates' fundraising behavior. In each model the effects are significant, and I consider each result in turn. When looking at the effect of limits on the average contribution amount, for both individuals and PACs, increasing the limit leads to larger average contributions.
On average, a 100% increase in the contribution limit leads to a 22% increase in the average contribution amount for individuals (Column 1, Row 1) and a 30% increase in the average contribution amount for PACs (Column 2, Row 4). The effects of removing limits entirely are much larger, as we would expect. When looking at the percent of donors who contribute the maximum amount (Columns 3 and 4), the effect of limits is similar. Lower limits constrain more donors by capping their contribution at the new, smaller, maximum allowable amount.
The final models (Columns 5 and 6) consider the effect of contribution limits on the total amount raised by candidates from either individuals or PACs. When changing individual limits, a 100 percent increase in the contribution limit leads to a 7% percent increase in the total amount raised from individuals. When increasing PAC contribution limits, a similar doubling of the limit leads to an 29% increase in the total amount raised from PACs. Again, for district partisanship, district median income, a dummy variable for the partisanship of the legislator, and state and year fixed-effects.
completely removing the limit has a much larger effect on contribution behavior.
Legislator Ideology and Total Receipts
To further make the connection between contributors, legislator ideology, and polarization, I
show that legislators who are more extreme do not pay a significant penalty in overall money raised. For individual contributions to plausibly play a role in polarization, it should also be the case that more extreme candidates are at least as well-funded (and possibly better funded) than moderate candidates. Otherwise the pull from ideological money would be outweighed by the prospect of money from groups favoring moderate candidates. Figure A5 shows this relationship for all incumbent state legislators. We see that extremists do not appear to pay a penalty for their ideological positions. The horizontal axis of the figure represents the ideological score of each legislator while the vertical axis plots the log of the total money raised by candidates. Candidates with centrist ideological scores do not raise significantly more than candidates on the ideological fringes.
Ideology and Total Receipts State Legislators
Ideology Score Log Total Money Raised Figure A8: Percent of PAC Fundraising from access-seeking PACs -The overwheliming majority of PAC money comes from access-seeking PACs as opposed to ideologically motivated PACs. This supports the theory that PACs are primarily motivated by access rather than ideology. Ideologically-motivated PACs are identified using codings in the original datasets.
Robustness of Ideology and Contribution Limits Model
I present here results using a variety of different model specifications. Overall, the results paint a similar picture to those presented in the main paper. Individual limits lead to more ideologically moderate legislators being elected while PAC limits lead to more ideologically extreme legislators holding office. Table A3 shows the same models as the main text be recodes the limit variables to be the ratio of individual limits to pac limits. Rather than treating each limit separately with two different variables, this considers the limits together in one variable of interest. Because ratios with unlimited contribution limits are problematic, Table A3 shows the results for states that have both an individual and pac limit in place. We see a similar result as in the main paper. As the ratio of individual limits to pac limits rises, more polarized legislators are elected to office. This is similar to the main result in the paper that finds that increases in the individual contribution limit after controlling for the pac limit leads to more ideologically extreme legislators being elected. Table A4 shows the same models, but is restricted to the years 2000 to 2012. This restriction ensures a complete panel of data for each state. As mentioned in the paper, contribution data is not available for all states through the 1990s. In 2000 the contribution data is complete for all 49 states included in the analysis. We see that excluding the 1990s does not substantially alter the results. Table A6 shows the same models as in the main paper but separated by the party of the legislator. Table A7 shows the same models as the main text but includes one observation for each legislator-year. In the main paper each legislator appears once in the data. Here the more time a legislator serves in office, the more he or she appears in the data. The results are consistent with the results in Table 2 . Table A8 shows the same models but uses alternative measures of the contribution limit.
The first two columns show the results using the unlogged contribution limit for the full data and professionalized state legislatures respectively. The last two columns show the results using a quadratic term rather than a log transformation. While consistent with the logged model, I choose to present the logged model in the main paper for two reasons. As contribution limits grow, we have reason to believe that the effect of marginal changes to the limit decreases. This diminishing returns hypothesis arises from previous work in campaign finance that finds that campaign spending exhibits diminishing marginal returns (Bonneau and Cann, 2011) . Additionally, I present the logged models in the main paper because of the significant right skew of the contribution data. A few states have extremely high limits (see Table 1 in the paper). To avoid the possibility of these states biasing the result due to their extremely large limit values, I take the natural log of the contribution limit in the main 4 http://www.ncsl.org/documents/legismgt/ilp/99tab2pt3.pdf 5 http://www.ncsl.org/documents/legismgt/ILP/96Tab5Pt2.pdf results of the paper.
Finally, Table A9 presents results using a different measure of polarization at the state level. Rather than considering the ideology of each individual legislator, I estimate a model in which the dependent variable is the ideological distance between the average Republican and Democrat in a state in a given year. This is a common measure of polarization at the level of the legislature, rather than the individual legislator. The results in Table A9 are similar to the individual level results presented in the main body of the paper. Higher individual limits lead to greater distances between the average Republican and Democrat in the legislature. On the other hand, higher limits on PAC contributions leads to a smaller difference between the typical Republican and Democrat in the legislature. Column 4 of Table A9 is reported as the last column of Table A3 : Legislator Ideology and Contribution Limits Ratio -In each model the dependent variable is the legislator's estimated polarization score. These models recast the contribution limits as a ratio between the individual contribution limit and the PAC contribution limit in the state. The models show that a higher individual to PAC limit ratio leads to more polarized legislators holding office. All results are shown with standard errors clustered at the district level. As an additional test of the model shown in Table 2 of the main paper, I recompute the model a number of times but in each case omit one of the states. Figure A9 Table 2 is rerun a number of times with one state omitted in each model. The vertical lines show the estimated effect when all states are included. We see that omitting any particular state does not change the results significantly.
Further Testing Exogeneity of Contribution Limits
To further test for endogeneity in the contribution limit changes within states, I conduct a placebo test in which I regress the amount of polarization in a state on the future contribution limit amount several years later. In this case, I choose five years, but results using different years are nearly equivalent. We see that in this case, the future contribution limits are not strong predictors of state level polarization. In each case, the coefficients are statistically insignificant -this is case both for unlimited contribution limits as well as the amount of the contribution limit when a limit is present. 
Why Do Contribution Limits Change?
A variety of research suggests that the three main ways in which campaign contributions change is thought legislative statute, citizen initiative, or through court orders (Connolly, 1996) . The constitutionality of contribution limits was first tested in the Supreme Court case Buckley v. Valeo in which the court ruled that reasonable contribution limits did not violate the first amendment and could be used as part of an effort to curb the "actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual campaign contributions." Through this ruling individual contribution limits at the federal level were set at $1,000. Many changes to limits at the state level have been challenged based on the argument that the limits were too low to be considered reasonable according to Buckely. For example, Missouri enacted a contribution limit of $100 on contribution limits in 1994. The limit was challenged by a former state legislator as a violation of his right to freedom of expression as a candidate.
The court subsequently overturned the limit. Similar challenges to low limits have been brought to the court in Minnesota, Montana, and Oregon. Whether or not politicians and interest groups should support such limits on contributions has been the subject of academic study. Some authors find that decreasing limits helps to protect incumbents from strong challengers by limiting their spending (Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo, 2006; La Raja, 2008) . However, others find that contribution limits hurts incumbents who are usually much better than challengers at raising large amounts of money (Pastine and Pastine, 2010; Hamm and Hogan, 2008; Stratmann, 2009 
